Here is my review of "The Myth of American Exceptionalism" by Godfrey Hodgson (Yale University Press, $26); from the FT.
In
a celebrated speech in 1974, Ronald Reagan quoted the words of a 17th
century preacher. "Standing on the tiny deck of the Arabella in 1630
off the Massachusetts coast, John Winthrop said, 'We will be as a city
upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us . . .'"
Godfrey Hodgson begins his debunking of American national mythology
with this "urtext of American literature". Reagan got the name of the
ship wrong: it was the Arbella. Winthrop most likely preached his
sermon in Southampton, England, not off the coast of Massachusetts.
"More important, he was of course not preaching to Americans about the
future of the United States of America . . . He could not possibly have
imagined a United States. He was preaching to Englishmen, and
expressing his determination that the colony . . . [which] he and his
friends were setting out to found would be an example to other English
colonies."
A lot of what Americans think of as their history has been similarly
repurposed, Hodgson shows, to serve the myth of US exceptionalism. The
US is a great country - the author says he is an admirer - but less
extraordinary than it thinks, much more rooted in European history, and
for that matter not always an exemplar to the world. Indeed, Hodgson
devotes one of his six chapters to "the other exceptionalism" - a
catalogue of US failures in healthcare, education, inequality, race
relations, crime and punishment, social mobility, international
co-operation and human rights. To that list, given recent history, many
would add capitalism itself.
The book is interesting and lucid as it examines the errors and
exaggerations in the national self-image. But it lacks balance. Most,
if not all, nations cherish national myths and, standing back from the
current economic crisis, the US still has better grounds than most to
be pleased with itself.
Hodgson rightly says that it is better to get the record straight, because the truth about one's history is better than half-truths. But he also goes further: the US national myth is dangerous. If Americans are inclined to think of themselves as a uniquely virtuous nation, he argues, "this will affect the way they behave toward the rest of the world, over which they now have so much influence and so much power".
Hence, among other things, Iraq. "Oil was important," says Hodgson. "So was the wholly admirable commitment to support and defend Israel. But those concerns had been present for many years. By the 1990s the background to the growing obsession with Iraq among neo-conservatives was exceptionalist sentiment. Neither Saddam Hussein nor any other foreign leader must stand against the high historic mission of the US to bring democracy to the Middle East."
That charge can fairly be levelled at neo-conservatives, though not at everybody who supported the war. On the other hand, one should not forget that if a nation thinks of itself as virtuous, that may very well be a good thing, leading it to recognise obligations and shoulder responsibilities. Europeans have reason to be grateful for the myth of American exceptionalism, if it helped to move the US to rescue them from fascism and shield them from communism in the 20th century.
In the end, Hodgson finds the idea of American exceptionalism hard to bear only when it energises policies he disagrees with - that is, when it is married to stridently conservative politics and especially to neo-conservative foreign policy. His book is suffused with disgust at the presidency of George W. Bush, sometimes so much that it fogs the analysis. The Bush administration subscribed to the exceptionalist idea, staining it by association. The problem is, almost all US liberals are exceptionalists too.
The book was finished before Barack Obama's election victory. This makes some of Hodgson's judgments, and his continuing dismay at the "conservative ascendancy" - overthrown by the recession as well as the election - seem odd. In any event, Mr Obama's inaugural address relied as heavily on exceptionalist notions as did Reagan in 1974. And what Mr Obama said rang true. A predominantly white and supposedly conservative electorate had just chosen a black president. If the country thought, "only in America", this was a view shared by much of the world.
Consider the global excitement at Mr Obama's win. Whatever Winthrop's ship was called, the US is not just another country.
This isn't so much of a reasoned book review as an assertion that "yes we are". Yes we are unique, people pay attention because we are powerful, but we are not God's divine colony destined for leadership. Unique does not equal exceptional, and every snowflake is unique.
The system of government, shared prosperity, entrenched liberties and remarkable opportunities of the US are surely worthy of admiration.
Your only fact-based refutation of Hodgson is in this sentence. The truth is that there are other democracies, other countries with greater social mobility and opportunities, and most certainly other countries with better shared prosperity.
I don't think protecting our country from Hitler qualifies us as extra-special either. Your desire to be special overwhelms your critical facilities.
Ouch.
No, the US is not just another country. Let's hope it's a nation that continues to develop the capacity for self-examination and questioning: are we acting justly, responsibly, and fairly?
For without that ability -- and it is exceptional -- we're just bullies.
Thank you for the review.
Haven’t read the book, but it seems obvious that it must be generally correct and long overdue. American claims of exceptionalism have always been overblown. The reviewer wishes to redress the balance somewhat but he doesn’t succeed, or at least he chooses the wrong subjects to argue.
America is, or was a bog-standard western European state, but positioned in another continent and with the benefit of virtually unlimited space and resources.
There have been no obvious examples of exceptionalism in its history. Instead, when put to the test the Americans flunk as often – perhaps more often - as other Western nations. From being one of the last (perhaps last) western countries to abolish slavery to its failure to aid German Jews fleeing the Nazis; it has usually followed the trend – late and unapologetic. (Even Britain, a tiny country in comparison, gave virtually unrestricted access to German Jews in the last months before the war, and slavery in England at least, was outlawed in 1772, 90 years before America.)
Its support for Israel is questionable too. The expulsion of much of an entire people from their homeland of the previous 2000 years was one of the great injustices of the twentieth century. Nothing to be proud of; and almost certainly more to do with internal American politics than any belief in that “Chosen People” nonsense. That same preoccupation with internal politics continues to this day and Israel is the only country that America truly supports.
The comments about fighting fascism are a bit too much – drawn I’m sure from Hollywood propaganda.
America sided with Germany and Japan against a democracy - Britain - in the matter of navel arms limitations.
When Britain was the only country fighting fascism the Americans only cared about getting paid for the arms they SOLD to the British while they were fighting for their lives. And they made them move their gold reserves to South African so that following defeat America would still get its money. It is well known that the American people generally did not differentiate much between the democracy and the fascist state until war was declared on them. Understandable perhaps, but no evidence of exceptionalism.
“The system of government, shared prosperity and entrenched liberties” are about average for a Western country. Some good some not so good.
“Shared prosperity” is questionable. Why are poor Americans among the poorest in the Western world? The “remarkable opportunities” of the US are more to do with natural resources than political will.
“They certainly attract would-be immigrants from all parts of the world”. So what? All Western countries do; and they don’t have all that space, all those resources.
Susan:
Crook does not refute Hodgson. Crook describes the book as, "interesting and lucid as it examines the errors and exaggerations in the national self-image."
However, Crook does maintain that Hodgson's thesis, "lacks balance," and that it is ideologically motivated.
Sure, Luis A. del Valle-- because Crook values balance over accuracy.
"America sided with Germany and Japan against a democracy - Britain - in the matter of navel arms limitations."
Um, as a naval historian, this is just wrong, if you're referring to the Washington & London naval treaties. Germany was forbidden from having any substantial navy because of previous treaties, and Japan could only have 60% of the naval strength of either the United States or the UK. The system was 5:5:3:3:3 (Britain/United States/Itay/France/Japan). Japan did get some substantial advantage out of being a one-ocean naval power, IE it only had to concentrate on the Pacific whereas the numerically larger US and UK navies had other obligations.
Furthermore, the UK didn't have the military budget to go much larger than the Washington treaty anyways - they wanted naval arms limitations so they wouldn't have to invest ever-increasing resources into a naval arms race.
Also, it's bizarre to portray the United States lend-lease programs in WW2 as being an instance of greedy, money-grubbing capitalism. The U.S. got far less value in return for the material it shipped out; for domestic political reasons there needed to be some compensation, but Roosevelt made sure it wouldn't have to be paid during the war years and was really much lower than the actual value. Some was paid for by use of fairly minor bases; more was paid for through loans, but under very flexible and generous terms no private creditor would have been willing to accept. Then you have the Marshall Plan at the end of the war.
You'd have a better case if you looked at the U.S. in World War I and post-WWI, when part of the spiraling post-war economic crisis involved the triangle of Germany paying reparations to the U.K. and France so they could repay their loans to the U.S.
I guess I should probably add that there was, at first, a plan that more closely parallels what you sketched out (Cash & Carry) - although even it doesn't really fit what you're describing, since the payments were immediate. This intermediate step between the Neutrality Acts & Lend-Lease was probably necessary, and as important as the payment was that the goods be transported in Allied hulls (so the U.S. wasn't dragged into the war by submarine warfare). But Lend-Lease started 9 months before the U.S. entered the war, and Roosevelt moved to it once it appeared the Allies could not sustain Cash & Carry.
"Europeans have reason to be grateful for the myth of American exceptionalism, if it helped to move the US to rescue them from fascism and shield them from communism in the 20th century."
____________
Don't be absurd. First, by any reasonable measurement, the Soviets did more to defeat fascism than the Americans did. E.g., the Soviets killed 4 Germans for every 1 that the British and Americans COMBINED killed.
And second, the Americans didn't "shield" Europeans from communism; rather, it cynically consigned half of Europe to Soviet domination while making clear that its commitment to the other half would focus on nuclear power, because at the end of the day the US wasn't willing to commit to high casualties to defend the mere half of Europe it intended to defend at all.
None of this is a criticism: "shielding" Europe was by no means America's obligation. But let's be reality-based here.